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Entitlements for social security and occupational pensions present a major wealth component and play a central
role for financial security. However, most individual-level data lacks information on pension wealth. By linking
various data sources, this contribution estimates the present value of future pension entitlements in Switzerland for
statutory pensions, occupational pensions and third pillar accounts and analyses the distribution of augmented
wealth, which combines pension wealth and net worth. The CH-SILC survey from 2015 is used to estimate real
assets, financial assets and pension wealth of retired individuals. The pension entitlements of non-retired individuals
are simulated on the basis of their earning history from administrative records following the accrual method and
assuming a real discount rate of 2%. When pension wealth is added to net worth, average wealth doubles, and the
Gini-coefficient declines by 26%. The equalising effect is particularly strong for social security pensions. The wealth
distribution differs strongly between the three pillars of the pension system; there are also strong differences
between gender and age groups. In Switzerland, wealth accumulation continues after retirement age.
Keywords: Net worth, Augmented wealth, Pension wealth, Wealth inequality, Life cycle, SILC, Data linkage
1 Introduction
The high and rising wealth inequality receives growing at-
tention in modern societies and research on economic in-
equality. Different surveys (e.g. the Household Finance
and Consumption Surveys HFCS, the Survey on Aging
and Living Conditions SHARE, or the Luxemburg Wealth
Study) have started to collect microdata on wealth. How-
ever, most wealth estimates neglect pension wealth that—
for most individuals—presents the largest asset.
There are many reasons to consider pension entitlements
in wealth analysis. First, the inclusion of pension wealth has
profound consequences on the wealth distribution. Second,
pension rights are important for the comparison of wealth
between countries. According to the standard life-cycle hy-
pothesis, expected pension benefits and private wealth are
substitutes (Feldstein, 1974). If pension wealth crowds out
private saving, countries with more generous pension
schemes should have lower private savings than countries
with more limited pension schemes. Third, the omission of
pension wealth might result in misleading comparison of
wealth between covered and non-covered groups within a
country (e.g. wealth differences between employed and self-
employed). Fourth, pension wealth has been shown to in-
fluence many behaviours and decisions, such as private sav-
ings, composition of wealth portfolios or retirement timing.
When ignoring pension wealth, studies on these behaviours
could yield biased results. Finally, a better knowledge on
the inequality of pension wealth can be policy relevant.
At the same time, pension entitlements differ from
other assets in several respects: they cannot alleviate in-
come poverty, be used to purchase consumer goods, or be
passed on to others. Accordingly, pension entitlements do
not confer political power, social influence, or social status.
Furthermore, individuals have little control over how their
pension assets are invested and restrictions often apply for
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bequests. Finally, the tax system and welfare state treat
pension wealth differently from other assets. A further dif-
ference occurs for pay-as-you go systems, where entitle-
ments are not funded.
There is no agreement on how to deal with pension
wealth in analysis on wealth inequality. Some scholars
argue for ignoring pension wealth, as it does not give
“direct personal control over resources” (Alvaredo, At-
kinson and Morelli, 2018). The most widely used wealth
definition based on microdata is net worth, which refers
to the “value of all the assets owned by a household less
the value of all its liabilities at a particular point in time”
(OECD, 2013, p. 54). Net worth includes private pen-
sions, but not occupational and statutory ones. The term
“augmented wealth” refers to the broader definition of
wealth that includes entitlements to future pension
streams (Davies and Shorrocks, 2000). Organisations
such as the OECD suggest using augmented wealth as a
measure complementary to net worth (OECD, 2013, p.
67ff). While these definitions are standards in the micro-
approach to wealth analyses (see e.g. Wolff, 2015; Cow-
ell, Nolan, Olivera and Van Kerm, 2017, p. 177), they
differ from the macro-economic definition of wealth in
the core tables in the System of National Accounts
(SNA), which includes only funded pension wealth.
However, unfunded pension wealth is included in sup-
plementary data of the SNA to facilitate country com-
parisons (System of National Accounts, 2008, p. 369ff.).
Attempts at distributional national accounts, such as the
World Inequality Database (WID), usually follow the
wealth definition in the core tables of the SNA, which
include only funded pension wealth. Apart from theoret-
ical considerations, data availability and data comparabil-
ity often dictate the wealth definition used in empirical
studies.
This study documents the relevance and the distribution
of pension wealth in Switzerland and shows how it affects
wealth inequality. The analysis is based on a new linkage
of administrative and survey data with a matching rate of
over 99% of the sample. Survey data come from the CH-
SILC in 2015, which contains separate questions on vari-
ous real and financial assets including private pension ac-
counts. Administrative records are used to estimate
entitlements for social security and occupational pensions
for non-retired individuals at the basis of yearly incomes
since 1981. While the linked data allows a rather precise
estimation of statutory pension wealth, the simulation for
occupational pension wealth relies on many assumptions.
Following the OECD guidelines for Micro Statistics on
Household Wealth (OECD, 2013), I apply the accrual
method to estimate the present values of pension wealth
under the current pension system. For social security pen-
sions and ongoing second-pillar pensions, I estimate the
future pension stream on cohort- and gender-specific
survival rates assuming a real discount rate of 2%. For the
occupational pension, I estimate the accumulated capital,
which is influenced neither by life expectancy nor by re-
tirement age.
Several important findings come out of my analysis. In
line with experiences from other countries, pension
wealth is highly relevant and has an equalising effect on
wealth inequality. Twenty-eight percent of augmented
wealth consists of entitlements for social security pen-
sions, and another 23% consists of entitlements for occu-
pational pensions. Although the Gini coefficient of net
worth amounts to 0.76, it decreases to 0.65 when adding
occupational pensions and to 0.55 for augmented wealth.
Moreover, there are important wealth differences be-
tween men and women and between age groups. In con-
trast to findings of other countries, wealth accumulation
over the life span continues beyond retirement age.
The methodological approach followed has the advan-
tage of making results comparable to estimates for
Germany and the USA by Bönke, Grabka, Schröder and
Wolff (2019) but comes with some limitations. Firstly, it
ignores the heterogeneity in life expectancy by socio-
economic groups, which applies also in Switzerland (e.g.
Mackenbach et al., 2019; Wanner and Lerch, 2012). As
high-income groups live longer compared to low-income
groups, they will receive benefits for a longer time and
limit the equalising effect of pensions (Haan, Kemptner
and Lüthen, 2019). Secondly, the accrual method does not
take account of future pension reforms but assesses the
situation in 2015. Due to both effects, the redistributive ef-
fect of pension wealth will be weaker in reality. The im-
pact of increasing pension age on wealth inequality is
simulated as a sensitivity analysis, which shows a small
desequalising effect of such reforms.
While analysis of augmented wealth is common in the
USA and UK, there have been only a few attempts to
measure the distribution of augmented wealth in Europe
(Roine and Waldenström, 2009 for Sweden; Maunu,
2010 for Finland; Bönke, Grabka, Schröder, Wolff and
Zyska, 2019 for Germany). All studies reveal a mitigating
effect of pension assets on wealth inequality. To my
knowledge, there have been no attempts so far to empir-
ically measure augmented wealth in Switzerland. This
country presents an interesting case, as it has a very high
wealth concentration at the top but a rather average
wealth inequality when measured with the Gini index.
Moreover, the share of private occupational pensions is
(with 31% of post-retirement disposable income) among
the highest in OECD countries (OECD, 2019).
A simulation for top wealth shares was conducted by
Föllmi and Martínez (2017) based on two simplified sce-
narios for occupational and private pension wealth but
not social security pensions. Assuming an equal distribu-
tion of pension assets, the simulation showed that the
Kuhn Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics          (2020) 156:19 Page 2 of 16
wealth share of the top 10% of the population would de-
crease by 27 percentage points. Assuming that shares in
pension wealth would correspond to share in labour in-
come, the top 10% wealth share was lowered by 20 per-
centage points. The individual data used in my study
show a slightly weaker reduction in inequality because
occupational pensions are more unequally distributed
than labour income and because pension wealth and
other assets are positively correlated.
A related body of literature addresses the effect of pen-
sion entitlements on savings. According to the life cycle
hypothesis, individuals save during their working lives and
commence with dissaving after retirement (Modigliani,
1986). Accordingly, a change in the expected pension ben-
efits should alter private wealth by the same amount
(Feldstein, 1974). Although empirical studies find evidence
for such crowding out, the rate is considerably lower than
one (e.g. Attanasio and Brugiavini, 2003; Bottazzi, Jappelli
and Padula, 2006; Chetty, Friedman, Leth-Petersen, Niel-
sen and Olsen, 2014; Feng, He and Sato, 2011). Explana-
tions for the limited substitution include bequest motives,
short-sightedness, liquidity constraints, risk associated
with future reforms, individual information and non-
marketable future benefits (Bottazzi et al., 2006, p. 2188).
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I briefly
present the pension system in Switzerland and review lit-
erature on wealth inequality in Switzerland. Section 3 de-
scribes the data and methodological approaches used.
Section 4 documents the estimation of pension wealth. Re-
sults are discussed in Section 5; Section 6 discusses pen-
sion reforms and provides sensitivity analysis for the
impact of widowhood pensions, different discount rates
and increasing retirement age; and Section 7 concludes.
2 Background: the pension system and wealth
distribution in Switzerland
The Swiss pension system consists of three pillars: the
statutory Old Age and Survivors’ Insurance (OASI), oc-
cupational pension plans and private voluntary tax-
exempt savings. The statutory retirement age is 65 years
for men and 64 years for women. In the following, I
briefly present each pension type in turn referring to the
legislation from 2014. I emphasise restrictions on the
use of pension wealth, as these give rise to the argu-
ments for and against including each pension asset in
the wealth definition.
The first pillar covers the entire residential population, in-
dividuals who migrated to Switzerland after retirement
present an exception. The OASI is financed mainly on a
pay-as-you-go basis by contributions of 8.4% of the em-
ployee’s income without a cap. This rate was increased in
2019 to 8.7%. Childcare years for children under age 16 are
additionally credited. Contributions made during marriage
are split equally between partners in the event of divorce or
once both partners are retired. With full contributions (be-
ginning at the age of 21 and up to the official retirement
age), monthly pensions are between 1170 and 2340 CHF
(in 2014) depending on the average income during the in-
surance period. Missing contribution years lead to perman-
ently lowered pensions. Pensions are reduced for early
take-up (possible 2 years before regular retirement age) and
higher for later retirement. The pension of a married
couple is capped at 150% of the maximum individual pen-
sion. In case of widowhood, the surviving partner receives a
pension. There are no gender differences in pensions:
women’s average monthly pension in December 2014
amounted to 2024 CHF, and men’s average pension to
2023 CHF (Federal Social Insurance Office, 2015).
The second pillar of the pension system has a compul-
sory and supplementary part. Contributions to occupa-
tional pensions are compulsory for earnings between
CHF 24,570 and CHF 84,240, but all individuals who
earn at least 21,060 CHF per year from the same em-
ployer are covered with a minimal insured income of
3510 CHF. Therefore, not all part-time workers have a
second pillar account. The legislation defines minimum
contribution rates that increase with age (from 7% for
employees aged 25 to 34 to 18% for employees older
than 55 years of age). The pension funds must pay inter-
est on the accumulated capital; a minimum interest rate
is stipulated by the Federal Council.
Most pension funds provide benefits in addition to this
compulsory insurance. At the end of 2016, there were
1713 pension funds in Switzerland (Swiss Federal Statis-
tical Office, 2017). Most funds also insure income above
84,240 CHF up to the legal threshold of CHF 846,000, or
they apply higher contribution rates than the legal mini-
mum. Pension funds are also free to set the interest rate in
the voluntary area. Many pension funds apply lower in-
come thresholds for part-time workers. Unfortunately,
there are no official statistics on average contribution rates
or interest rates.
In addition to fixed contributions from employment
income, insured persons can make voluntary payments
into the pension fund, which are tax-deductible and
therefore most attractive for individuals with a high tax-
able income. Self-employed individuals can contribute to
the second pillar on a voluntary basis.
At retirement, individuals can choose between capital
withdrawal and annuitisation of their occupational pen-
sion entitlements, but a minimum age of 58 years ap-
plies. The choice is influenced by life expectancy, future
income, tax rates and individual preferences (Bütler and
Ramsden, 2016). At retirement, 50% chose annuities,
32% capital and 19% a combination of capital and yearly
pensions (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2019b). In the
case of annuities, the pension amounts to 6.8% of assets
for the mandatory part and can be freely defined by the
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pension fund for the voluntary part. Because conversion
rate of 6.8% is too high considering life expectancy (see
e.g. Eling, 2018), the rates are usually much lower in the
supplementary part.1 In addition, the second pillar can
be withdrawn before retirement to acquire a residential
property or create a business. The payout of savings is
taxed at a privileged tax rate and generally without con-
sideration of any other income. After the payout, wealth
taxes apply annually, but they are relatively low. Occupa-
tional pensions are, in principle, contribution funded.
However, the pensions of many retired persons exceed
their savings, which leads to a redistribution of wealth
from the active to the retired population.
The third pillar consists of voluntary private contribu-
tions. Conditional on employment, individuals older
than 25 years can deduct their contributions from tax-
able income up to a yearly amount of 6739 CHF (in
2014); a higher threshold applies to self-employed indi-
viduals. As occupational pensions, third-pillar accounts
can be withdrawn before retirement for the purchase of
a property or the formation of a business. Withdrawal is
possible up to 5 years before ordinary retirement age.
Table 1 gives an overview of mean pensions and
coverage rates of the Swiss pension. Because there are
no official statistics on coverage rates and average pen-
sions in the second and third pillar, I rely on the SILC
data from 2015. The statistics underlines the importance
of occupational pensions in Switzerland in terms of both
payouts and income after retirement.
Wealth inequality in Switzerland the high average
wealth in Switzerland is well documented in the national
accounts by the Swiss National Bank (SNB). In contrast,
there has been little research on wealth distribution. All
we know so far on wealth inequality is based on tax re-
cords. The Swiss Federal Tax Administration (2019) pro-
vides annual estimates of the Gini coefficient, which
amounted to 0.86 in 2015. Dell, Piketty and Saez (2007)
and Föllmi and Martínez (2017) analysed top wealth
shares, which showed that the richest 1% owned 40% of
all taxable wealth in 2011. This is a concentration
greater than in any other country in the World Inequal-
ity Database (WID) but close to wealth concentration in
the USA. One reason for the high concentration at the
top of the wealth distribution is the high share of mil-
lionaires and billionaires residing in Switzerland, but an-
other is the absence of all types of pension wealth in tax
records. Other problems with tax data are that it under-
values housing wealth and refers to tax units rather than
households. The most recent global wealth report
(Shorrocks, Davies and Lluberas, 2018), as well as an
analysis of survey data (Ravazzini, Kuhn, Brulé and
Suter, 2019), estimates the Gini-coefficient of
Switzerland to be 0.74 and 0.76 respectively, which is
around the worldwide average and rather high in Euro-
pean comparison.
3 Data
The main database of this study is the SILC survey
from 2015 conducted by the Swiss Federal Statistical
Office (SFSO). This survey contained an experimental
wealth module with separate questions on financial,
real estate and third pillar assets, as well as mortgages
and valuables for 7468 households and 10,164 individ-
uals. Missing values have been imputed by the SFSO,
and survey weights are used to correct bias in terms
of age, sex, income and other characteristics. Al-
though the survey is a good basis for estimating net
worth for the general population, some limitations of
the database need to be mentioned. First, the survey
data do not cover the top of the wealth distribution
well. Considering the highly skewed distribution of
wealth, tax records are better suited for this purpose.
For this reason, I do not provide estimates for the
top shares of the wealth distribution. Second, infor-
mation on private loans (apart from mortgages) and
businesses is lacking. Third, the value of real estate
does not always refer to the current market value, but
rather to taxable values of houses (16% of house-
holds), purchase price (17%) or insurance values (6%).
To correct this bias, all values have been converted to
current market values using the region-specific real
estate price index of the SNB and conversion-rates
used by the Swiss National Tax Conference (see
Ravazzini et al., 2019 for details).
To estimate pension wealth, the SILC data were com-
plemented with administrative records. The different da-
tabases were linked on the basis of a project-specific
contractual agreement. Most importantly, the survey
data were linked to the federal income registry, which
contains yearly income records as far back as 1981. As
the registry contains all the income sources that contrib-
ute to statutory pensions, it is perfectly suited to simu-
late future pensions. In addition, several population
registries were used, namely the registry containing the
population at the end of 2014 (Statpop), the marriage
registry, the divorce registry, the birth registry and the
death registry. These records were used to find marriage
dates to apply income splitting during marriage and
birth years of children used to estimate credits for child
rearing.
Most of the administrative records could be merged
with unique anonymised social security numbers.
Probabilistic linkages using birth, marriage, divorce or
1For example, the SBB (a large pension fund) will decrease the
conversion rate to 4.96% in 2020 and to 4.73% in 2022. There have
been several political attempts to decrease the minimum conversion
rate of the compulsory part of the pension funds, but a reduction has
been declined in the referendum in 2017.
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bereavement dates have been applied for events that
occurred before 2010 where a social security number
was not available (see Additional file 1 for details).
The matching rate with the income registry amounts
to 99.5% for individuals in the age range between 21
and 65. Marriage dates could be identified for 98.8%
of married individuals. The linkages necessary to ob-
tain the birth years of children were more complex,
as several data sources were involved and probabilistic
linkage was necessary in a few cases. Because the true
number of children is unknown, there are no match-
ing rates to be reported. Of all the children that are
listed in the SILC data (children living with their par-
ents), 97.3% could also be found in the population
registries. In particular, grown-up children who were
born outside of Switzerland could be missing. Two
reasons explain the high matching rates for data link-
age: social security number was contained in the sam-
pling frame and the linkage required no additional
consent from survey respondents.
4 Estimation of pension wealth
4.1 The present value approach
The estimation of pension wealth involves many as-
sumptions about the future in terms of personal earn-
ings, legislation and characteristics of the pension
scheme. I follow the present value approach proposed in
the OECD guidelines (2013). Although it relies on fewer
assumptions than alternative methods, assumptions on
risk adjustment, discount rates, borrowing constraints
and future policy changes are necessary (Davies & Shor-
rocks, 2000).
The present value of entitlements from a pension





1þ ið Þt  pension
p
t ð1Þ
with sa, t denoting the probability of a person of age a
surviving until year t, T − a indicating the remaining
maximum lifespan differentiated by sex and birth cohort
and i representing a constant discount factor (here 2%).
I do not take inflation explicitly into account and assume
that pensions will increase at the same rate as inflation.
This avoids assumptions on future inflation rates and
wage progression, which would be necessary to estimate
pension streams.2 A retired person receives the pension
from period t = 0 (here 2015) onward. A non-retired
person receives the pension starting in a future period t
> 0, when the person reaches regular retirement age. If
survivor benefits are provided, these also have to be in-
cluded in the possible stream of payments, with the ap-
propriate probabilities attached. For the application in
Switzerland, I only consider entitlement from survivors’
pensions if such a pension has already been received. To
assess the potential bias of this omission, I simulated
survivors’ pensions as a sensitivity analysis. Simulations
with alternative discount rates are also presented as a
sensitivity analysis.
If individuals receive a pension, the measurement of
pension wealth is relatively straightforward. Following
the accrual method from Eq. (1), each annuity is
weighted by the probability of being paid (survival prob-
abilities published by the SFSO, 2019a) and discounted
to the present value.
The estimation of individuals’ entitlements before re-
tirement is more complex as no pension can be ob-
served. In a defined contribution scheme, the current
value equals the equity accumulated in the fund so far
and not yet withdrawn or rolled over into an annuity. In
a defined benefit scheme, the present value is the pen-
sion benefit that individuals would receive from the
current scheme at retirement time assuming that the
persons would not earn additional benefits in the future.
This means that I assume that the persons will not be
employed between the current time and the time of re-
tirement. For applying Eq. (1) to estimate the pension
Table 1 Overview of old-age benefits in Switzerland
Pension scheme Mean gross pension (CHF/ month)1 2014 Share of recipients 20142 Mean pay-out at retirement (CHF) 20153
OASI 1883 98.8%
Occupational pensions 2577 49.0% 167,805
Third pillar 55.2% 59,028
1Only individuals receiving a pension. Source: own calculations from CH-SILC 2015
2OASI and occupational pensions: shares among retired individuals living in Switzerland. Third pillar: share of individuals aged 51–60 years. Source: own
calculations from CH-SILC 2015
3Source: New pension statistics (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2019b)
2Statutory pensions increase with an average of expected price and
wage growth. So far, statutory pensions increased faster than inflation,
which means that the present value approach might underestimate
statutory pension wealth. For example, pensions have increased from
2005 to 2015 by 9.3%, whereas inflation was only 2% over this time-
period. For occupational pensions, there are no legal obligations to ad-
just pension to inflation, but there are no statistics on the extent to
which pension funds compensate for inflation. As occupational pension
is likely to increase slower than inflation, I am likely to overestimate
occupational pension wealth. Because occupational pension wealth is
mostly based on the capital stock, this bias will be small.
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stream, each payment needs to be converted to its
present value and weighted by the survival probability.
4.2 Pension entitlements for retired persons in
Switzerland
The estimation of pension entitlements is relatively
straightforward for retired individuals, as ongoing pen-
sions are recorded in the SILC data. Nevertheless, the
estimation process involves several assumptions and
coding decisions that need to be mentioned.
In some cases, pensions measured in 2014 are bad
predictors for future pensions and need to be
adapted. For the first pillar, this is the case for irregu-
larly high pension amounts, for individuals who re-
ceived a pension during only part of 2014 and for
married individuals whose partner is not yet retired.
For the second pillar, adaptations are required for in-
dividuals who received the pension only during part
of 2014. Moreover, the plausibility of high pension
amounts was checked. An additional documentation
describes this in more detail (see Additional file 2).
The data quality of statutory pensions in the SILC
data is very high because variables rely on informa-
tion from the pension registry (Swiss Federal Statis-
tical Office, 2017b). The critical cases for data quality
are individuals who transition to retirement because
their pensions needed adaptations. Figure 1 compares
mean and median values of the statutory pensions in
the SILC data with the new pension statistics for in-
dividuals at ordinary retirement age or younger.
Values of the two data sources are very close (0 to
4% difference) and within the 95% confidence interval
of the SILC data.
Figure 2 compares entitlements for occupational pen-
sions of retired individuals. For women, the mean in the
new pension statistics differs only by 3% from the mean
in the SILC data. For men, estimates are 13% higher
than in the SILC data but remain within the 95% confi-
dence interval. Some very small pensions might not have
been declared in the SILC survey but be captured in the
new pension statistics.
4.3 Pension entitlements of non-retired persons in
Switzerland
Entitlements of non-retired individuals are computed on
the basis of their earning history. The accrual method
assumes that the current legislation will remain un-
changed until regular retirement age. For the statutory
OASI pensions, the simulation takes account of the in-
come history, credits for child rearing and equal splitting
of income earned during marriage between spouses. Be-
cause pensions are computed based on the same admin-
istrative records that are used to determine the actual
pension level, the estimation should be rather precise.
Nevertheless, approximations were necessary in some
cases. Earnings before 1981 are not recorded. Therefore,
imputations for missing earnings were performed for
women born between 1951 and 1959 and men born be-
tween 1950 and 1959. Older persons who already
reached ordinary retirement age by 2014 usually receive
a pension. For younger persons, earnings before 1981
are not relevant for the pension level. Another problem
arises for divorced individuals because information of
the ex-spouse’s income history is lacking, and income
splitting for the years of marriage cannot be applied.3
Similarly, information on any previous marriages of
those who remarried after a divorce is lacking. Finally,
credits for child rearing might be underestimated if not
all children were identified in the administrative records.
To test the quality of the present value of non-retired
individuals, I compare observed pensions with simulated
pensions for the same individuals. This is possible for
people who have retired recently.4 Figure 3 compares
the entitlements from observed and simulated pensions
for individuals who reached official retirement age
between 2012 and 2014 and who receive a statutory old-
age pension. The figure shows a downward bias in
pension wealth for divorced women because income
splitting during marriage years was ignored due to data
restrictions. Moreover, women have higher entitlements
than men, due to their higher life expectancy. Although
the estimation of the first pillar entitlements can be con-
sidered as accurate, the simulated pensions should how-
ever not be used to study the impact of divorce on
pension wealth.
I turn next to entitlements for occupational pensions
for non-retired individuals. The present value equals the
assets that have been accumulated so far. Therefore, it is
not necessary to estimate the pension stream. Neverthe-
less, many assumptions are required. I assume that the
entire income above the minimum legal threshold con-
tributes to the second pillar (up to the legal value of 846,
000 CHF per year). To compute the insured income for
men, I subtract the entire coordination deduction, which
defines the lower level from which onward earnings con-
tribute to occupational pensions (between 16,590 and
25,320 CHF depending on the year) from the employ-
ment income. For women, I subtract only half of the
coordination deduction. The reason for the different
3Only in rare cases that income splitting has been explicitly asked for
at the time of divorce, the splitting is already implemented in the data.
4The younger the respondents, the better the comparability between
the two approaches. Older individuals have more years before 1981
with unknown income. Furthermore, the parameters to estimate
pensions have varied over the years. Pensions simulated from income
records apply the parameters for 2014, whereas the pensions of retired
individuals have been computed with parameters for the year they
received the first pension.
Kuhn Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics          (2020) 156:19 Page 6 of 16
treatment is that many pension schemes apply a re-
duced coordination deduction for part-time workers.
Most women in Switzerland, but very few men, work
part time. Unfortunately, the hours worked in the
past that would allow for more fine-tuned scenarios
are not available.5 For the contribution rates, I as-
sume an average rate of 18.27 in 2015 (Federal So-
cial Insurance Office, 2017, p. 28) and take into
account differences between age groups and economic
sectors (see additional file 2 for details). For the inter-
est rates, I assume the minimum interest rate defined
by the federal council for each year.
Additional (voluntary) contributions to the second pil-
lar as well as premature withdrawals could not be con-
sidered in these estimates.6 By ignoring purchases into
and withdrawals from the pension fund, the inequality of
occupational pension wealth might be underestimated.
Firstly, only individuals with a positive net worth are
able to transfer assets to the pension fund. Secondly, a
transfer of financial assets into the second pillar is a
means to reduce taxes. The transferred amount can be
deducted for income tax in the year of the transfer and
will not be subject to wealth tax as long it remains with
the pension fund. Therefore, purchases are most attract-
ive for individuals with high income subject to wealth
tax. Thirdly, premature capital withdrawal is most at-
tractive for individuals who have no access to other
assets.
To test the quality of the estimate, I compare again the sim-
ulations with observed pensions for the same sample of indi-
viduals who transitioned recently into retirement. Figure 4
shows the present value from observed pensions, from the
simulated pensions and from the simulated capital. The mean
values of the simulations are slightly lower than the mean
present value from the observed pension stream. For simu-
lated capital, the difference amounts 2% for men and to 18%
for women. This difference for women is reduced to 6% when
assets are transformed to annuities assuming a conversion rate
of 6.8%. Women’s higher life expectancy explains again the
difference between the present value for the pension stream
and the accumulated capital. Despite this difference, I will rely
on the current value of the capital stock for further analysis as
it does not require assumptions on conversation rates for an-
nuities, discount rates and life expectancy. Another problem
of this comparison is that some individuals might have with-
drawn part of their entitlements as a lump sum, which leads
to lower annuities.
Finally, I compare the estimated pension entitle-
ments with statistics from the National Accounts,
where the reported claims against insurance compan-
ies and pension funds in 2014 amounted to 112,741
Fig. 1 Accuracy of first pillar pension wealth of retired individuals
Note: SILC sample: individuals who reached regular retirement age in 2014 (n = 125 women, 101 men). Widower pension excluded, survey
weights applied. New pension statistics: individuals before or at regular retirement age who received their first pension in 2015 (n = 40,966 men;
44,116 women), weighted average. Source: CH-SILC 2015 (own calculation) and Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2019b)
5However, I tested alternative scenarios. If I do not adjust the
coordination deduction for women, I strongly underestimate women’s
pensions. If I apply half the coordination deduction of men, men’s
second pillar entitlements are strongly overestimated.
6Purchase into the pension funds are allowed up to the amount that
would have been accumulated if the individuals had earned the current
salary since the age of 25. In the future, linkage with the new pension
statistics will help to correct for lump-sum withdrawals made before
retirement from 2015 on.
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CHF per capita. Per capita wealth from occupational
pensions in the SILC data is 123,264 CHF, which is
9% higher. It is impossible to know to what extent
this difference is due to the partial underfunding of
retired individuals’ pensions and to what extent due
to an inaccurate simulation. Therefore, and because
of the conceptual differences between the SNA and
the present value approach, I do not adjust the enti-
tlements of occupational pensions to fit the national
accounts.
Fig. 3 Accuracy of simulated statutory pension wealth for non-retired individuals by civil status
Note: individuals who reached ordinary retirement age between 2012 and 2014 (n = 283 men, 298 women). Source: linked data from SILC 2015
and administrative records, own calculation
Fig. 2 Accuracy of second pillar pension wealth of retired individuals
Note: mean values. SILC sample: individuals who reached regular retirement age in 2014 and received an occupational pension, survey weights
applied. New pension statistics: individuals before or at regular retirement age who received their first pension in 2015 (n = 22,543 men; 13,207
women), weighted average. Source: CH-SILC 2015 (own calculation) and SFSO (2019b)
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5 Results
5.1 Individual pension wealth
I will first discuss adults’ pension entitlements for the
three pillars. Figure 5 depicts the distribution for men
and women and confirms that pension entitlements are
important wealth components. With a mean value of
165,000 CHF for men and 195,000 CHF for women, the
statutory pension (first pillar) is the most relevant pen-
sion asset. Women’s entitlements exceed men’s despite
their lower lifetime income. The first explanation is
women’s higher life expectancy. Indeed, men’s pensions
are slightly higher when we look at monthly pensions
Fig. 4 Accuracy of simulated second pillar pension wealth for non-retired individuals
Sample: individuals aged between 58 years and regular retirement age who receive an occupational pension of at least 6000 CHF per year (n =
611). Widowers have been excluded. Source: linked data from SILC 2015 and administrative records (own calculations)
Fig. 5 Individual pension entitlements in 2015: mean values by sex
Notes: individuals aged 18 years and older (n = 13,853); own calculations; survey weights applied. Source: linked data from SILC 2015 (experimental
data for wealth from 7 June 2018) and administrative records
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from the OASI. Further reasons are income splitting
during years of marriage that redistribute entitlements in
favour of the women, women’s lower retirement age and
the weak relationship between earnings and pension
levels in the first pillar. In contrast to the first pillar, gen-
der differences are large in the second and third pillars.
Men’s entitlements for occupational pensions are more
than twice as high as women’s (203,000 CHF versus 100,
000 CHF, respectively), reflecting men’s higher lifetime
income. Moreover, women who work part-time are
more strongly affected by the coordination deduction of
around 25,000 (which has varied over the years) for con-
tributive income. Women’s higher life expectancy has
only a small influence on entitlements for the second
pillar because the present value of non-retired individ-
uals refers to the accumulated capital instead of a pen-
sion stream. The third pillar entitlements are much
lower in comparison to other pension wealth. With a
mean value of 23,000 CHF for men and 11,000 CHF for
women, gender differences are large and reflect differ-
ences in lifetime earnings. The low amounts can also be
explained by the fact that individuals need to withdraw
their third pillar by 70 years of age at the latest.
Inequality levels differ strongly among the different
pillars of the Swiss pension system. With a Gini-index of
0.36, inequality is lowest for the first pillar. This reflects
the strong redistributive component of the OASI. In-
equality is considerably higher in the second pillar with
a Gini-coefficient of 0.69. Many individuals have a value
of zero, and pension levels vary strongly among those
covered by pension funds. Accordingly, the median value
is much lower than the average value (55,300 CHF ver-
sus 151,000, respectively), and the maximum present
value with 4.7 million is rather high. As expected, in-
equality in the occupational pensions exceeds inequality
in employment income. The third pillar shows the high-
est inequality level (Gini-coefficient of 0.82) because only
37% of adults hold a third pillar account.
An important part of inequality in pension wealth can
be explained by age. By construction, pension entitle-
ments accumulate over the life course until retirement
age. The trends shown in Fig. 6 reflect the legislation be-
hind the three pillars. Accumulation starts at the age of
20 for the OASI and at the age of 25 for the occupa-
tional pension wealth and the third pillar. Entitlements
decline after retirement in line with the remaining life
span. Third pillar assets need to be withdrawn by the
age of 70. Inequality in pension entitlements is therefore
largely caused by legislation and the simple fact that
pensions stop with the end of life.
Because young individuals are likely to experience up-
ward wealth mobility, inequality between age groups and
within age groups has different implications. To distin-
guish the two, I decomposed the Theil index by eight
age groups, which is shown in Table 2. Whereas age ex-
plains 73% of the inequality in statutory pensions, age
makes up a smaller part of the inequality in occupational
pensions (34%). Finally, age groups are least relevant for
the third pillar, as they explain only 22% of total inequal-
ity. If we look at inequality within age groups only, the
Fig. 6 Personal pension entitlements in 2015 by age
Note: values refer to the mean values of 5-year age groups. Weighted data. Source: linked data from SILC 2015 (experimental wealth data from 7
June 2018) and administrative records
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Theil index of occupational pensions is more than 10
times higher than the Theil index of statutory pensions
(Table 2). This demonstrates the strong redistributive
component of the OASI. With a Theil-index of 1.2 for
within inequality, inequality in third pillar entitlements
remains high even after isolating the age effect. Again,
this can be explained by the large share of individuals
who do not hold a third pillar account. Considering total
pension wealth, inequality amounts to a Theil-index of
0.38, which is slightly higher than that for the first pillar
(0.22). The third pillar entitlements have only a small in-
fluence on the inequality of total pension wealth because
average levels are rather low compared to statutory and
occupational pension wealth. More than half of the in-
equality can be attributed to age groups. Therefore, age
has a large impact on pension wealth but inequality re-
mains rather high in the second and third pillar even
after singling out differences between age groups. In par-
ticular, inequality in pension wealth is very high for the
elderly.
5.2 Augmented wealth
To address augmented wealth, I switch from the individ-
ual to the household level. This is necessary because
SILC measures real and financial assets at the household
level; third pillar accounts present an exception. In line
with standard definitions, I attribute third pillar accounts
to net worth. Augmented wealth in Switzerland amounts
to 535,400 CHF per capita for the mean and to 307,700
for the median, which is very high in international com-
parison. Half of the augmented wealth consists of pen-
sion wealth (entitlements for the first and second pillar).
The average entitlement for the first pillar is 147,000
CHF, which is slightly higher than the average entitle-
ment for second pillar, which amounts to 123,300 CHF.
Given that Switzerland already has the highest level of
net worth in international comparison (Shorrocks et al.,
2018), the high level of pension wealth counters the sub-
stitution hypothesis that states that private savings are
low if pension wealth is high.
My estimates reveal a positive correlation between net
worth and pension wealth. For the total population, the
correlation coefficient amounts to 0.19. The relationship
is stronger for the working age population (coefficient of
0.26) than for the retired (coefficient of 0.08). The weak
correlation found among the retired can be explained by
lump-sum withdrawals of second pillar entitlements at
retirement and might be driven by tax incentives.
Table 3 gives further insights on the wealth portfolio
by deciles of net worth (net housing wealth, bank ac-
counts, stock and bonds and valuables). For the lower
deciles, pension wealth makes up almost the entire aug-
mented wealth. At the same time, most pension wealth
for the second and third pillars is concentrated in the
upper part of the distribution. The 30% richest house-
holds in terms of net worth own 60% of private pension
wealth and 55% of occupational pension wealth. The
highest decile stands out, as pension wealth presents
only a relatively small part of their assets. This analysis
refers to per capita household wealth, but findings for
total household wealth are shown in an additional table
(see Additional file 3).
Regarding the inequality of aggregate wealth measure,
which is shown in Table 4, the first two pillars of the
Table 2 Decomposition of individual pension wealth in 2015 by age groups
Pop.
share
First pillar Second pillar Third pillar Pension wealth
Theil Contr. Theil Contr. Theil Contr. Theil Contr.
18–20 4% 1.66 4.0% 0 0 0 0 1.59 1.1%
21–30 16% .05 1.3% 1.09 1.2% 1.46 3.7% .10 0.1%
31–40 17% .07 2.8% .44 3.3% 1.03 8.8% .15 3.1%
41–50 20% .06 5.0% .44 10.0% 0.92 18.4% .17 8.6%
51–60 17% .05 5.5% .52 16.6% 1.14 26.6% .18 12.6%
61–65 7% .04 2.3% .54 10.6% 1.67 13.4% .16 6.5%
66–75 11% .04 3.2% .78 16.0% 3.43 5.7% .16 7.9%
76 + 8% .03 1.5% 1.10 8.3% 3.56 1.1% .16 3.5%
Within .06 27.3% .59 66.1% 1.21 77.9% .17 44.7%
Between .16 72.7% .30 33.9% .35 22.1% .21 55.3%
Total .22 100.0% .90 100.0% 1.55 100.0% .38 100.0%
Note: sample size: n = 13,881 adults. Source: linked data from SILC 2015 (experimental wealth data from 7 June 2018) and administrative records
7The third pillar has only a small impact on inequality. When
excluding third pillar accounts from net worth, the Gini coefficient
rises to 0.77, meaning that the third pillar reduces wealth inequality by
2 points.
8The top 10% shares in the SILC data drops from 60 to 45%, when
occupational pensions are added. However, the top 10% shares are
underestimated in the survey as top wealth holders are not well
covered in the data.
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pension system contribute to a reduction in wealth in-
equality. 7 Adding only the second pillar entitlements to
net worth, the Gini coefficient declines by 10 points or
13% from 0.75 to 0.65.8 Given that entitlements from oc-
cupational pensions might be overestimated compared
with the SNA and considering that voluntary transfers
to the second pillar are ignored, the reduction in in-
equality might even be weaker in reality. The equalising
effect is much stronger for statutory pensions. When
added to net worth, inequality is reduced by 17 points or
23% to 0.57. Together, pension wealth of the first and
second pillars reduces wealth inequality by 26% to 0.55.
In both pillars, the inequality reduction presents an
upper value, as heterogeneous life expectancy is not con-
sidered here due to lack of appropriate data. For occupa-
tional pensions, this bias is weaker as the present value
of individuals before retirement (capital stock) is inde-
pendent from life expectancy.
To look at the contribution of the different wealth
components to wealth inequality, a decomposition ana-
lysis is required. According to a factor decomposition of
the Gini index (Rao, 1969)9, entitlements for statutory
pensions amount to 28% of net worth but account only
for 16% of the inequality. Occupational pensions amount
to 23% of augmented wealth and contribute 21% to in-
equality. Net worth constitutes 49% of augmented
wealth but contributes 63% to inequality of augmented
wealth. This underlines again the strong redistributive
effect of the OASI in Switzerland.
To situate the results in an international context, re-
sults can be compared with those of Bönke, Grabka,
Schröder and Wolff (2019) on Germany and the USA.
Average wealth in Switzerland is much higher than in
these countries. The gap in average wealth widens when
accounting for pension wealth. The equalising effects of
pension wealth in the three countries are comparable. In
Germany, the Gini index decreases by 33% or 0.26
points when pension entitlements are added to net
worth. This is slightly stronger than in Switzerland,
where the Gini coefficient declines by 25% or 0.20
points. Despite the high inequality of net worth in the
USA, the equalising effect of pension wealth is weaker
(− 20% or − 0.18 points). Consequently, the difference in
wealth inequality between the USA and the other coun-
tries does not diminish when accounting for pension
wealth.
Finally, Fig. 7 illustrates the accumulation of wealth
over the life course. According to life-cycle theory,
wealth should reach the maximum level at retirement
age. However, net worth in Switzerland does not follow
this pattern. Average net worth keeps increasing up to
the age of 75 (cf. Fig. 7). Pension wealth explains this re-
lationship to some extent, as lump-sum withdrawals of
second and third pillar assets increase net worth around
retirement age. Accordingly, pension wealth declines
after retirement due to payouts and declining life span.
Adding pension wealth, wealth accumulation indeed
stagnates at retirement. Nevertheless, decreasing average
wealth levels are only observed after 76 years. Therefore,
pension wealth cannot explain this relationship entirely.
This pattern is in line with an analysis of the fiscal data
for the canton of Zürich that show jumps in wealth at
the end of the working life and beginning of retirement
age (Moser, 2019). With a longitudinal analysis at the in-
dividual level, Moser confirms that wealth accumulation
continues beyond retirement age. Therefore, the pattern
cannot be attributed to higher mortality of individuals
with lower wealth. However, it needs also to be noted
that the SILC data include only private households.
Table 3 Distribution of per capita household wealth in 2015 by net worth decile
Net housing and financial wealth Third pillar Occupational pensions Statutory pensions Augmented wealth
1. Decile − 7756 − 5% 1002 1% 111,759 71% 51,876 33% 156,880
2. Decile 3146 2% 1273 1% 103,780 66% 48,111 31% 156,309
3. Decile 10,132 6% 4145 2% 105,375 60% 56,860 32% 176,511
4. Decile 23,063 11% 7301 3% 114,380 53% 71,135 33% 215,879
5. Decile 49,002 19% 10,754 4% 118,934 45% 85,034 32% 263,724
6. Decile 89,976 26% 13,924 4% 133,192 38% 111,249 32% 348,340
7. Decile 147,837 33% 16,551 4% 150,145 34% 133,320 30% 447,854
8. Decile 234,899 40% 21,144 4% 174,439 29% 164,176 28% 594,659
9. Decile 411,390 46% 27,291 3% 221,310 25% 228,516 26% 888,507
10. Decile 1,553,209 74% 35,232 2% 236,336 11% 282,598 13% 2,107,375
Note: Decile of net wealth. Housing and financial wealth includes real estate, bank accounts, stocks and bonds and valuables. Per capita values include all
household members. Percentages refer to the percentage of augmented wealth
9G = ∑ skCk, where G refers to the Gini coefficient of total income
inequality, sk refers to the share of income source k in total household
income and Ck refers to the concentration coefficient of income source
k.
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Some of the dissaving once people move to an institu-
tion is ignored in this analysis.
Inherited wealth presents another explanation for the
high wealth levels seen among those between 60 and 75
years of age. Tax data from the canton of Bern confirm
that probabilities of significant inheritance are highest
around 60 to 65 years, followed by the age range of 66 to
75 years (Jann and Fluder, 2015).
6 Sensitivity analysis: pension reforms, discount
rates and survivors’ pensions
In the following, I address pension reforms and conduct
simulations for additional scenarios, namely an increase
of statutory retirement age, different discount rates and
the inclusion of widowhood pensions.
Mainly due to the rising life expectancy, the current
Swiss pension system is unsustainable and needs to be
reformed by a combination of increasing retirement age,
additional funding or cuts in benefits. Besides economic
arguments for different reforms (Börsch-Supan, 2016;
Grossmann and Strulik, 2019), political feasibility is an
important element to consider, as pension reforms need
to pass a referendum in Switzerland. Current reform
proposals for old-age pensions involve lower conversion
rates for occupational pensions, increase in retirement
age and increased funding (Häusermann, Kurer and Tra-
ber, 2019). Pension retrenchment seem to be the least
accepted reform element by the population (Häuser-
mann et al., 2019, p. 1074).
These possible reform elements have different redis-
tributive consequences. Lowering conversion rates for
occupational pensions has no effect on augmented
wealth as measured here. Additional funding is likely
to have an indirect impact on wealth inequality, but
this effect depends on the source of funding and
Fig. 7 Wealth over the life span
Source: linked data from SILC 2015 (experimental wealth data from 7 June 2018) and administrative records
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of pension wealth and augmented wealth in 2015 (household level, values per capita)
Mean p25 p50 p90 Gini
Net worth 265,181 (8796) 14,325 79,333 608,865 .75 (.007)
Statutory pensions 146,953 (817) 62,045 105,486 311,846 .39 (.002)
Occupational pensions 123,264 (1324) 19,933 60,770 319,050 .61 (.003)
Augmented wealth 535,397 (9360) 138,050 307,728 1,147,761 .55 (.008)
Net worth + PV1 412,134 (8959) 100,423 223,953 852,562 .57 (.004)
Net worth + PV2 388,323 (9137) 55,593 95,495 88,398 .65 (.005)
Note: sample size n = 7468 households. Standard errors in parenthesis. Per capita values include all household members. Source: linked data from SILC 2015
(experimental wealth data from 7 June 2018) and administrative records
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would require the development of a specific model
that is beyond the scope of this article. For the sensi-
tivity analysis, I focus on increasing the retirement
age, as this is both a reform element actually dis-
cussed in political debates and one with direct redis-
tributive consequences.
A higher retirement age lowers the present value of pen-
sion wealth. With a retirement age of 68 years, the median
present value of statutory pensions decreases by 22% for
women and by 18% for men compared to current retire-
ment age (65 for men and 64 for women). The unification
of pension age reduces the gender gap which is in favour
of women. At the individual level, the Gini coefficient for
statutory pension wealth increases from 0.36 to 0.39. At
the household level, the Gini index of augmented wealth
increases from 0.55 to 0.57. Entitlements for occupational
pensions are not affected by a higher retirement age.
Estimates on pension wealth are also sensitive to the
choice of the discount rate applied to pension streams.
The real discount rate for the reference scenario is set to
2% here, following studies by the OECD (2005), Bönke,
Grabka, Schröder, Wolff and Zyska (2019) and Wolff
(2015). Another frequent choice in micro-studies is a
rate of 3% (e.g. Bönke, Grabka, Schröder, Wolff and
Zyska, 2019; Maunu, 2010). The rate of 2% rate is
slightly higher than the interest rates for government
bond rates, which are recommended by the OECD as
the basis for estimating pension wealth (OECD, 2013).
The higher the discount rate is set, the lower is statutory
pension wealth and the higher is inequality of statutory
pension wealth. The estimates for occupational pension
wealth are less sensitive to the discount rate because they
rely only to a small extent on future pension streams. The
higher the discount rate, the smaller is the redistributive
effect of pension wealth. Assuming a discount rate of 1%
(e.g. according to risk-free interest rates), the Gini coeffi-
cient of augmented wealth amounts to 0.5. Assuming a
discount rate of 5% (e.g. according to returns to invest-
ment), the Gini coefficient of augmented wealth amounts
to 0.61. The additional file 5 provides estimates for alter-
native discount rates ranging from 1 to 5%.
The simulation has ignored the present value of
widowhood pensions due to data limitations, unless indi-
viduals already receive such a pension.10 To get an idea
of the resulting bias, I simulated the present value of
survivors’ pension imposing assumptions on future mar-
riage, birth of children, change in statutory old-age pen-
sion following bereavement, as well as benefits granted
by occupational pensions, that yield rather an upper
limit for these entitlements (see Additional file 4).
For statutory pensions, this simulation shows that survi-
vors’ pensions have only a minor impact on aggregate
wealth. Statutory pension wealth is increased by about
5%, mainly due to higher old-age pensions for widows
and widowers and the increasing likelihood of bereave-
ment with age. As women profit more strongly from
widowhood pensions, the gender gap in favour of
women for first pillar wealth is increased by these pen-
sions. However, widows’ pensions do not affect the Gini
index for statutory pension wealth. Widows’ pensions
play a more important role in occupational pensions. In
the simulated scenario, entitlements increase by 14% and
the Gini index at the individual level decreases from 0.69
to 0.63. A major reason for this reduction is a lower
gender-gap (in favour of men). At the household level,
the inclusion of widowhood pensions has a much weaker
impact, as gender-differences play a smaller role. Con-
sidering both statutory and occupational widows’ pen-
sions, the addition of survivors’ pensions increases per
capita augmented wealth by 6% but does not affect in-
equality as measured by the Gini coefficient significantly.
The decomposition of pension wealth by age groups is
not altered once widow’s pensions are considered. In
sum, widowhood pensions are relevant for the analysis
of gender-pension gap but not for wealth inequality at
the household level.
7 Conclusions
Wealth inequality is a key aspect of economic inequality.
As in other countries, wealth differences in Switzerland
are much larger than income differences. However, most
estimates on the wealth distribution neglect pension
wealth. When pension wealth is added to net worth in
Switzerland, average wealth doubles in Switzerland.
Statutory pensions constitute 28% and occupational pen-
sion 23% of augmented wealth.
When focusing on augmented wealth instead of net
worth, wealth inequality is considerably lower. The Gini
coefficient declines by 26% to 0.55. However, there are
strong differences between the different pillars of the
Swiss pension system. The statutory pensions have a
strong equalising effect that reflects their redistributive
character. The equalising effect of occupational pensions
is much weaker. Even after considering pension wealth,
wealth inequality remains high and well above income
inequality.
The findings do not support the hypothesis that the
pension system crowds out private savings. House-
holds with large amounts of saving tend to have
higher pension entitlements. Moreover, differences be-
tween countries do not narrow once pension wealth
is considered. The life-cycle model is also only par-
tially supported by the data, as wealth increases even
10Reasons for the omissions are lack of data and many unknown
parameters for the simulation. The eligibility for a widowhood pension
depends on the marital status, year of marriage, and the age of
children at the time of bereavement. In the occupational pensions,
pension funds have a lot of leeway in structuring widow’s pension.
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after retirement up to a rather high age. This suggests
that many individuals save more during their active
phase than used after retirement. The concentration
of wealth among the retired population raises also the
question whether inequality between generations and
within the elderly is problematic from a societal and
economic perspective.
The linkage of survey data with administrative re-
cords enabled an analysis of wealth differences by
sex and age groups. In particular, 73% of the in-
equality of first pillar pension entitlements can be
attributed to age. In contrast, occupational and pri-
vate pensions show high inequality levels, even after
controlling for age. For overall pension wealth, more
than half of the inequality can be attributed to age
groups. My analysis has also revealed an important
gender-pension gap. Women’s lower earnings over
the life cycle translate directly into lower entitlement
for occupational pension and third pillar assets. In
contrast, women have a higher present value of fu-
ture social security pensions that can be explained
by life expectancy and income splitting during
marriage.
This analysis comes with some limitations. While
the simulations for first pillar entitlements are quite
precise, simulations for occupational pensions are
based on many assumptions and are subject to uncer-
tainty. Lump-sum withdrawals or additional contribu-
tions before retirement could not be taken into
account. Such changes in occupational pension wealth
occur frequently through capital splits at divorces.
The only realistic possibility to better estimate the as-
sets in the second pillar is to collect this information
directly in the survey or through linkage with many
pension funds. Another important limitation is the ig-
norance of heterogeneity in life expectancy. When
income-specific survival rates are used, the equalising
effect of pension wealth would be substantially lower
than estimated in this contribution (see Haan et al.,
2019 for Germany). Besides life expectancy, several
other aspects not covered in this paper are likely to
have distributional consequences, notably the choice
between annuities and capital payout in the occupa-
tional pension and pension reforms other than in-
creasing retirement age are important points for
future research. Finally, the importance of statutory
pension wealth and its redistributive effect depend on
assumptions on the discount rate.
The results have several policy implications. The
finding that third-pillar wealth correlates strongly with
other wealth suggests that an extension of third pillar
assets in Switzerland will neither improve financial se-
curity for those in need nor reduce wealth inequality.
Moreover, a lower coordination deduction in the
occupational pension would be a means to reduce
wealth inequality both between men and women and
between low and high earners. In contrast, an in-
crease of retirement age will not strongly affect
wealth inequality.
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